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The Sum of the Parts is Greater Than the
Whole: Why Courts Determining Subject
Matter Eligibility Should Analyze the Patent-
Eligible and Unpatentable Portions of the
Claim Separately Instead of Treating the
Claim as a Whole
by WILLIAM J. CASEY*
I. Introduction
After almost thirty years of silence on the topic of patent-eligible
subject matter, the Supreme Court issued two significant decisions in
the past three years.' In Bilski v. Kappos, the Court overruled the
Federal Circuit's use of the machine-or-transformation test as the
exclusive test for patent eligibility of processes and instead found that
the machine-or-transformation test is only a useful clue to determine
patent eligibility.! Though the Court clarified that an exclusive test
should not be used to determine whether a claim is directed to patent-
eligible subject matter, its decision provided little guidance on how
courts should make this determination.'
In the wake of Bilski, the Federal Circuit issued several opinions
trying to reconcile ongoing ambiguity regarding what subject matter
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013; M.B.S.,
Keck Graduate Institute, 2006; B.S., Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, 2004. 1 would
like to thank Professor Jeffrey Lefstin for his invaluable feedback and mentorship
throughout the Note-writing process and Jenna Kelleher for her suggestions, which greatly
improved the quality of this Note. Additionally, I would like to thank the editors of the
Hastings Science and Technology Law Journal for their hard work in the editing process.
1. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
2 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226-27.
3. See Id. at 3231; Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History
and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 60 (2011).
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is patent eligible.4 While the Federal Circuit resolved cases on narrow
bases, it did not adopt a consistent methodology that permitted
applicants, practitioners, and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
to understand where lines should be drawn.5 Much of this difficulty
stems from an inability to articulate a method that differentiates
unpatentable "post-solution activity" from patentable processes that
contain laws of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract ideas without
relying on the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test to
determine patentability.
6
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, the
Court analyzed the claims in Prometheus' patents, offering an
example of how patent eligibility can be properly determined.7 But
the Court did not articulate a broadly applicable method for lower
courts and the PTO to follow when determining whether a claim is
directed to unpatentable subject matter or a patent-eligible
application of unpatentable subject matter.8
This Note proposes a method of determining patent eligibility.
In the proposed method a claim is explicitly divided into unpatentable
and patent-eligible portions and the portions are analyzed separately
to determine whether the claim is directed to patent-eligible subject
matter. Though this conflicts with the Court's prior admonishments
to treat claims as a whole, such treatment will provide greater clarity
in understanding the limits of patent-eligible subject matter because it
will force the Court to articulate when a claim based upon
unpatentable subject matter becomes patent eligible.9
This Note is divided into five sections. Following this
Introduction, Section II of this Note will trace the jurisprudence that
underlies both the development of exclusions to patent-eligible
4. SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 131.9 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Research
Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 864-65 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Cybersource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber,
674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
5. Research Corp. Techs., Inc., 627 F.3d at 868 ("[T]his court will not presume to
define 'abstract' beyond the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit
itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible subject matter
and the statutory context that directs primary attention on the patentability criteria of the
rest of the Patent Act.").
6. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,590 (1978); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226-27.
7. Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. at 1297-99 (2012).
8. Id.; Parker, 437 U.S. at 590.
9. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89(1981) ("[Claims must be considered as a
whole.").
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subject matter and the rationale for treating claims as a whole.
Section III recognizes the conflicts between patent-eligible subject
matter and treating claims as a whole and proposes an alternate way
of analyzing claims. The proposed method involves breaking a claim
into its patent-eligible and unpatentable portions. Then, it calls for
the application of a three-factor analysis of the patent-eligible
portions of the claim to determine whether the claim confers patent
eligibility. Section IV of this Note highlights Federal Circuit decisions
made after Bilski, but before Prometheus, focusing on the approach
that the court took in determining whether subject matter was
patentable and demonstrating how applying the three-factor analysis
would lead to more clear decisions. Finally, Section V concludes that
moving away from treating the claim as a whole will help clarify
section 101 analysis for courts and practitioners.
II. Historical Background: The Evolving Definition of Patent-
Eligible Subject Matter and How to Read the Claim in Making
this Determination
Courts and patent practitioners have long striven to establish a
clear definition of patent-eligible subject matter and a method to
interpret the scope of a claim.'0 In the realm of patent-eligible subject
matter, the Court has struggled to annunciate the difference between
an unpatentable claim containing a law of nature, physical
phenomena, or abstract idea combined with mere post-solution
activity and a patent-eligible claim that is a patentable application of
an unpatentable law of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract idea."
Additionally, courts have oscillated back and forth between
interpreting a claim based on its inventive concept or on each of its
limitations. Though the Court has discussed these concepts
separately, courts have blended together its interpretational
doctrines. An understanding of the bases of each of these doctrines
is necessary before determining how the Court should mark the
border between patent-eligible and unpatentable claims.
10. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 56 U.S. 156 (1852); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S.
248 (1850).
11. Parker, 437 U.S. at 590; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309 (1980); Bilski,
130 S. Ct. at 3231.
12. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966).
13. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
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A. The Development of Exceptions to Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
The Supreme Court has long tried to determine the appropriate
scope of patent-eligible subject matter.'4  But the scope and the
proper test or tests to determine if an invention is patentable continue
to challenge the courts.'5 In 1793, the first Patent Act defined
patentable inventions as "[any new and useful art, machine, or
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new or useful
improvement [thereof]."' 6 Since this original legislation passed it has
been little changed.'7 Thus, the scope of patent-eligible subject matter
is based on the Court's interpretations of that statute. Over time, the
Court has interpreted section 101 of the Patent Act to mean that
"laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas" are
unpatentable.'8 But, since all inventions to some degree rely on laws
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas, it is unclear where
unpatentable claims end and patent-eligible claims begin.
In Le Roy v. Tatham, the Supreme Court began the struggle to
articulate the limits of patent-eligible subject matter.'9 There, the
Court acknowledged, "a principle is not patentable. A principle, in
the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive
right. ' °
Soon after though, the Court began to acknowledge the tension
in defining the difference between unpatentable laws of nature and
patentable applications of these laws.2' In O'Reilly v. Morse, the
Court held that a patent covering printing at a distance using electro-
magnetic power was invalid, although a specific machine using the
14. See, e.g., Le Roy, 56 U.S. at 156; O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
15. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3231 ("In disapproving an exclusive machine-or-transformation
test, we by no means foreclose the Federal Circuit's development of other limiting criteria
that further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.").
16. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182.
17. Id. In the Patent Act of 1952, "process" replaced the term "art." Id. Thus, today
patents are granted to "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
18. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,309 (1980).
19. Le Roy, 56 U.S. at 175.
20. Id. at 175.
21. See O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112, 118.
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principle of electromagnetism was patent eligible.' Though this
opinion also reflected concerns about claim breadth, the Court
addressed patent eligibility, noting that when obtaining a patent, "it
makes no difference ... whether the effect is produced by chemical
agency or combination; or by the application of discoveries or
principals in natural philosophy known or unknown before his
invention; or by machinery acting altogether upon mechanical
principles."'' All that mattered was that a useful result be produced
in any "art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."2  Thus,
the Court implied that while a principle is not patentable, a machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or process that applies a
principle is patent-eligible subject matter.'
In the years following these early holdings, the Court has
attempted to clarify what is patent eligible. In Funk Brothers Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the Court determined that a combination
of naturally occurring bacteria was not patent-eligible subject
matter.26 There, different strains of Rhizobium bacteria allowed
plants to convert nitrogen in the air to organic nitrogenous
compounds with varying efficiencies.27 The various strains of bacteria
usually inhibited one another.8 But, the patent applicant discovered
that in a specific combination the strains did not inhibit one another
and filed for a patent to protect this discovery.29 In explaining why
this discovery was not patentable, the Court held that "the qualities
[of the bacteria] are the work of nature" and that the combination of
bacteria "is no more than the discovery of some of the handiwork of
nature and hence is not patentable."'
22 Id. at 118. Morse's invalid eighth claim reads, "I do not propose to limit myself to
the specific machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and
claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or
galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or
printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of
that power which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer." Id. at 112 (internal
quotation omitted).
23. Id. at 119.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).
27. Id. at 128-29.
28. Id. at 129.
29. Id. at 130.
30. Id. at 130-31.
112 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Later, in Gottschalk v. Benson, the Court held that the use of a
mathematical formula on a general purpose computer was not patent
eligible based on preemption concerns." There, the patent claimed a
method of converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals to pure
32binary numerals on any type of general-purpose digital computer.
In its holding, the Court noted that the "[t]ransformation and
reduction of an article to a different state or thing is the clue to
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines."33 The Court also held that, if allowed, "the patent would
wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself."'  Thus, the Court
appeared to rest its determination on grounds of preemption of the
unpatentable abstract idea embodied in the claim.
In Parker v. Flook, the Court attempted to resolve Benson's
concerns of preemption by requiring patent-eligible portions of the
claim to contain an inventive concept in order for the claim to be
patent eligible. 3 The Court held that a patent covering a method of
updating alarm limits was invalid. 6 In Flook, the Court explicitly
acknowledged the tension in determining whether a claim is directed
to patent-eligible subject matter when it noted that while "a process is
not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or
mathematical algorithm," post-solution activity cannot "transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process."37  The Court
attempted to provide guidance in reconciling this tension by holding
that "[e]ven though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical
formula may be well known, an inventive application of the principle
may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon
cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in
its application."'' In applying these principles to the patent at issue,
the Court held that the patent was not directed to patent-eligible
subject matter because there was no other inventive concept in the
patent application.39
31. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,70 (1972).
32 Id. at 64.
33. Id. at 70.
34. Id. at 71-72.
35. Parker, 437 U.S. at 594.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 590.
38. Id. at 594.
39. Id.
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In Diamond v. Diehr, the Court moved away from Flook's and
Benson's approaches of looking for an inventive concept in a patent-
eligible portion of the claim.4° The Court determined that a process
for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision
products was patent-eligible subject matter under section 101.4, In
Diehr, the Court distinguished Benson, noting that there the only
practical application of the algorithm was in connection with a
general purpose computer while in Diehr the only use of the formula
that was foreclosed was the use of the formula in conjunction with the
other steps of the process.4  To help guide other courts in
determining whether subject matter is patentable, the Court stated
that
[Cilaims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to
dissect the claims into old and new elements and then to ignore
the presence of the old elements in the analysis. This is
particularly true in a process claim because a new combination
of steps in a process may be patentable even though all the
constituents of the combination were well known and in
common use before the combination was made. The "novelty"
of any element or steps in a process ... is of no relevance in
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within
the §101 categories of possibly patent-eligible subject matter.'
Thus, the Court held that
When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements
or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the
patent laws were designed to protect (e.g. transforming or
reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of § 101.4
These decisions created a tension in approaches to determining
patent eligibility. While Diehr instructed courts to treat claims as a
whole, Benson and Flook instructed them to look for an inventive
concept within the patent-eligible portions of the claim. 5 The Federal
40. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 188-89.
41. Id. at 192-93.
42. Id. at 185-87.
43. Id. at 188-89.
44. Id. at 192.
45. See id.; Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72; Parker, 437 U.S. at 594.
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Circuit interpreted Diehr as moving away from Benson and Flook,
which led the court to announce that a claim is patent eligible if the
claim produces a "useful, concrete and tangible result."'4 State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. probably
represents the high water mark for the breadth of patent-eligible
claims as subsequent Federal Circuit decisions also continued to use
the machine-or-transformation test based on the Court's decision in
Benson.7 The differing applications of these two tests led the Federal
Circuit to determine in In re Bilski that the machine-or-
transformation test should be the sole test to determine patent
eligibility.' The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to review the
Federal Circuit's opinion.49
Commentators had hoped that the Court, in deciding Bilksi,
would provide clarity on how to reconcile Diehr, Benson, and Flook.s°
However, the Court instead issued a narrow ruling that provided little
analytical guidance." First, the Court endorsed the view that patent-
eligible subject matter is broad, but not unlimited.2 It then noted that
the concepts covered by the exceptions to patentability are "part of
the storehouse of knowledge of all men... free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none." 3 The Court continued, holding that
because section 101 is a "dynamic provision designed to encompass
46. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (1998)
(quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). In State Street, the Federal
Circuit articulated an inclusive view of patent eligibility in which "the transformation of
data... by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations constituted a practical
application of an abstract idea. Id.
47. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (2008) ("The machine-or-transformation test is a
two-branched inquiry; an applicant may show that a process claim satisfies § 101 either by
showing that his claim is tied to a particular machine, or by showing that his claim
transforms an article.") (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 70).
4& Id.
49. Id. at 3218; Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3329.
50. See Eric D. Kirsch & Elizabeth Reilly, The Emperor Bilski's Wearing No Clothes,
983 PLI/Pat 71, 92 (2009).
51. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. In Bilski, the Supreme Court evaluated claims directed
to a process of hedging risk in the energy market. Id. at 1323. While the court found the
claims at issue to be unpatentable, it declined to create a rule that all business method
claims are unpatentable. Id. at 3228-29, 3231.
52. Id. at 3225 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-09) ("Congress plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given a wide scope. . . . The Court's
precedents provide three specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent eligibility principles:
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
53. Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
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new and unforeseen inventions,"," the machine-or-transformation test
should not be the sole criterion for determining patent eligibility."
The Court held that, while the machine-or-transformation test was
well suited to the Industrial Age,
The Information Age empowers people with new capacities to
perform statistical analysis and mathematical calculations with a
speed and sophistication that enable the design of protocols for
more efficient performance of a vast number of business tasks.
If a high enough bar is not set when considering patent
applications of this sort, patent examiners and courts could be
flooded with claims that would put a chill on creative endeavor
and dynamic change.56
The Court then applied this ruling to the claim at issue and held
that the claim was not patent-eligible because it was an unpatentable
abstract idea. Finally, the Court concluded by noting that the
Federal Circuit was free to develop "other limiting criteria that
further the purposes of the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with
its text."58
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
the Supreme Court seemed to come down in support of the logic
underlying Benson and Flook rather than Diehr For the first time,
the Court interpreted section 101 as implicitly embodying the goal of
promoting innovation through the grant of a patent while not
impeding innovation with an overly broad patentW In its analysis, the
Court noted that the portions of the claim that were not directed to
unpatentable subject matter were not sufficient to make the claim
patentable. It then acknowledged several situations that do not
allow additional limitations to confer eligibility. First, the Court held
that a restriction to a specific technical environment does not confer
54. Id. at 3227 (quoting J.E.M. Ag. Supply, 534 U.S. at 135 (2001)).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3229.
57. Id at 3231.
58. Id.
59. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298-99. In Prometheus, the Court evaluated the patent
eligibility of claims directed to a process of determining the proper dose of a drug with
known therapeutic effects. Id. at 1295. The process included measuring the level of
metabolites in the blood and increasing or decreasing the drug dosage based on the
measurement. Id
60. Id. at 1294.
61. Id. at 1297.
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patent eligibility.62 Second, the Court noted that obvious activity,
whether it takes place before or after the solution, does not confer
patentability.63 Third, the Court noted that the combination of the
separate steps did not add anything new to the steps individually. '
Finally, in an attempt to tie its past opinions together, the Court
noted that a policy goal underlying and supporting section 101 is to
preserve the use of basic scientific tools to enable future innovation.6,
The Court then applied these limitations to the patent at issue.66
Though the Court did affirm that the claim should be treated as a
whole, its analysis indicated otherwise. Instead, the Court looked
first to the "administering" step and found that doctors already
administered thiopurine drugs for autoimmune disorders before the
patent was filed.68 Then, the Court looked at the "wherein" language
and found that it referred doctors to the unpatentable portions of the
claim to determine how much thiopurine to administer.69 Next, the
Court noted that the "determining" step told doctors to perform a
well-known and well-understood activity. °  Finally, the Court
considered the three steps of the claim together and found that the
combination of the steps added nothing beyond the utility of the steps
individually.7' Thus, the Court concluded the claim was not directed
to patent-eligible subject matter because each portion of the claim
that was not directed to an unpatentable abstract idea did not
sufficiently limit or add to the abstract idea?2 Though logical, such
analysis conflicts with the Court's admonition to treat the claim as a
whole.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1298.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1305.
66. Id. at 1297-1298.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1297.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1297-98.
71. Id. at 1298.
72. Id.
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B. Interpretation of the Claim as a Whole
Prior to 1952, the Court waivered in its preferred method of
analyzing a claim.73 Sometimes, the Court endorsed the view that
courts should focus on the "inventive concept" within a claim, while
at other times focusing on treating the claim as a whole.74 The
preferred method of interpretation greatly affected the scope of
exclusion that a patent granted. According to the "inventive
concept" theory, the patent was meant to protect the core inventive
concept disclosed.75 On the other hand, treating the claim as a whole
put the focus on the claim as the way to determine the metes and
bounds of the invention.76 However, since Congress passed the 1952
Patent Act, the Court has consistently held that claims should be
interpreted as a whole.77 The difference in the two approaches is
particularly relevant in three areas of infringement: non-obviousness,
the doctrine of equivalents, and repair.
Treating the claim as a whole for purposes of non-obviousness
analysis allows a comparison between elements in prior art references
and the claim in question instead of comparing the inventive concept
in a patent to obvious variants of other known inventive concepts.78
Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 codified prior court rulings that
required an invention not only to be novel, but to be non-obvious as
well.79 Section 103 ensured that a patent would not be issued if "the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time of invention. "* Additionally, "[p]atentability
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was
made.",8 1 The Court interpreted the 1952 Act as overruling the "flash
of creative genius" test it previously articulated.' It also interpreted
73. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 (citing Cuno Eng'g. Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941)); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit's Jurisprudence, 43
Loy. L. REv. 843,845-46 (2010).
74. Graham, 383 U.S. at 15.
75. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336,344 (1961).
76. Id. at 345-46.
77. See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 1; Diamond, 450 U.S. at 175.
78. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2143.
79. Graham, 383 U.S. at 14.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (emphasis added).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
82. Graham, 383 U.S. at 15.
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Section 103 as affirming its decisions dating back to Hotchkiss, which
held that "whatever appears to be covered by the claim of the
patentee as his own invention must be taken as part of the claim; for
courts of law are not at liberty to reject any part of the claim."
8
Treating the claim as a whole also narrowed the application of
the doctrine of equivalents, making a patentee's exclusionary grant
narrowerl Prior to the 1952 Act, the Court gave less weight to the
claim language when applying the doctrine of equivalents.85 Instead,
the Court allowed a patent to cover an invention that fell outside the
language of the claim, but still "perform[ed] substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."
' '
But even at the time of Graver Tank, there was concern with this
interpretation because of the idea that what was "not specifically
claimed [wa]s dedicated to the public."''  This decision was
interpreted to allow equivalents to the inventive idea in the claim and
permitted the broadening of claim scope88 But the Court later
clarified that it really intended the doctrine of equivalents to apply
only to individual elements of the claim and that the core inquiry is
"[d]oes the accused product or process contain elements identical or
equivalent to each claimed element of the patented invention? ' 9
This statement supported the Court's later decision to analyze claims
as a whole. The Court interpreted the doctrine of equivalents in a
manner that would not broaden the scope of the claim, as would have
been the case under the inventive concept theory.
Finally, the doctrine of repair or reconstruction was impacted by
the claim as a whole treatment because it allowed greater amounts of
repair without infringing a patent.9° In determining whether a repair
or reconstruction had been made, courts prior to 1952 based their
decisions on whether the replacement of a portion of the patented
product was a minor repair.9 ' But when the Court confronted this
problem in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., it held
83. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 259.
84. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17,28-29 (1997).
85. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,607 (1950).
86. Id. at 607-08 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator
Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30,42 (1929)).
87. Id. at 614.
88. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 28-29.
89. Id. at 29, 40.
90. Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 346.
91. Id. at 338.
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that the replacement of unpatented components of a patented
combination was within the right of an owner to repair.2 This
decision supported the claim as a whole thinking because it treated
each claim element equivalently and did not look for an inventive
core of the claim.9 Thus, the exclusionary grant given to the patentee
was narrowed under the claim as a whole doctrine.
After these decisions, a patent claim came to be thought of as
defining the "metes and bounds" of an invention instead of mere
"verbalism" used to describe the invention." Accordingly, it is
perhaps not surprising that the Court in Diehr imported this thinking
to section 101, holding that "claims must be considered as a whole."95
Of particular note is the lack of citation or rationale when making this
statement.9 Instead, the Court seemed to unthinkingly import their
rationale for treating the claim as a whole in the infringement context
into section 101. This unthinking importation has caused the courts
problems in developing a clear test to determine when a claim is
directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
III. The Problem with Interpreting the Claim as a Whole and a
Three-Factor Analysis for Determining Whether a Claim is
Patent Eligible
The problem with treating the claim as a whole while making
determinations as to whether a claim covers patent-eligible subject
matter is that it is usually impossible to determine whether a claim is
directed to a law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea
without breaking it apart. While treatment of the claim as a whole
allows the Court to divide a claim into portions directed to patent-
eligible and unpatentable subject matter in the same way that the
Court matches elements of claims to prior art when determining
novelty or non-obviousness, such treatment does not allow the Court
to judge what type of limitations need to be present in the patent-
eligible portions of a claim to confer patent eligibility on the claim.9
Instead, the Court is left to issue conclusory opinions stating simply
92- Id. at 346.
93. Id.
94. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607; MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, §
21.73.05(a).
95. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 188.
96. Id.
97. See Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 344-46.
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that the claim as a whole is not patent eligible because it is directed to
unpatentable subject matter." Luckily, the claim as a whole
requirement can easily be abandoned for section 101 purposes.
A. Reasons to Abandon Claim as a Whole Interpretation to Determine
Whether the Claim is Directed to Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
There are two compelling reasons to stop treating the claim as a
whole when determining patent eligibility. First, judicial opinions
have already stopped analyzing claims as a whole, so the Court should
not continue to articulate a policy that it does not itself follow.
Second, breaking the claim apart actually serves to further the policy
goals of section 101.
The Court's analysis in Prometheus did not treat the claim as a
whole.99 Instead, the Court analyzed the patent-eligible portions of
the claim separately and looked to their inventiveness in making its
patent-eligibility determination."W Discussing the novelty of a
particular portion of the claim is anathema to the claim as a whole
method of claim interpretation.' ' Thus, while the Court gave no
explicit indication that it was moving away from the treatment of
claim as a whole, its analysis was conducted in a manner that conflicts
with the claim as a whole doctrine."
Looking at the novelty of the patent-eligible portions of the
claim, instead of treating the claim as a whole, also serves the policies
underlying section 101. Section 101's requirements attempt to relieve
the tension between preventing the monopolization of "the basic
tools of scientific and technological work" that could impede, rather
than promote, innovation and provide incentives to inventors to
continue to innovate.' 3 The goal then, is to allow an inventor to
"claim all that they have actually invented" and nothing more.,°
Thought of in this way, the purpose of section 101 is served by
dividing the claim because the portion of the claim directed to
98. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.




103. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1325-26 (2011); Mayo
Collab. Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
104. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. at 1328.
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unpatentable subject matter is not and cannot be inventive.' 5 Thus, if
there is no inventive concept in the other portions of the claim, the
patentee is not entitled to the patent.
B. Three-Factor Analysis to Determine if a Claim Is Patent Eligible
In lieu of treating the claim as a whole, the PTO and the courts
should execute a three-factor analysis. Before beginning the analysis,
the examining institution should explicitly divide the claim into
unpatentable and patent-eligible portions.'06 This division, which will
force the acting institution to specifically identify the unpatentable
and patent-eligible portions of a claim in its opinions and office
actions, will have two beneficial effects. First, a required division of
claims into unpatentable and patent-eligible portions will ensure that
institutions make reasoned, rather than conclusory, patent eligibility
determinations. Second, the dissemination of such reasoned
determinations will create a tapestry of decisions, which will provide
patent practitioners more guidance on when a claimed invention is
patent eligible.
After dividing the claim, the institution should conduct the three-
factor analysis to determine if the claim limitations directed to patent-
eligible subject matter are sufficient to confer patent eligibility. The
three factors that an institution should balance when determining
patent eligibility are dependency, preemption, and novelty/non-
obviousness.
The first factor that should impact decisions of patent eligibility
is the dependence of the unpatentable subject matter on the patent-
eligible subject matter. This requires an investigation of whether the
unpatentable matter would still have utility even in the absence of the
patent-eligible subject matter. For instance, if the unpatentable
subject matter has no utility without the patent-eligible subject matter
in the claim, this is a clue that the claim is patent-eligible. In SiRF
Technology, the Federal Circuit held that the claim at issue was
patent eligible because a person's position could not be determined
without the use of a GPS receiver.'7 This logic also seems to apply to
the decision in Research Corp., which held that halftoning was patent-
105. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 ("[L]aws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas .... [are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." (quoting Funk
Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130 (internal quotation marks omitted))).
106. By "institution," I mean the PTO or the court reviewing a claim.
107. SiRF Tech., 601 F.3d at 1332. See generally infra Section IV-A.
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eligible because it could not be performed without a computerya, On
the other hand, in Cybersource, the claimed method of detecting
fraud could have been performed by pen and paper, leading the court
to conclude that the claim was not patent-eligible.'09
The second factor that should impact the determination of patent
eligibility is the preemption of the unpatentable concept by the claim.
Preemption concerns have been a recurring theme in the Court's
decisions."0  In analyzing this factor, when the claimed invention
preempts more of the law of nature, physical phenomena, or abstract
idea previously identified when the claim was divided, there are
greater concerns that the claim is unpatentable. For instance, the
claim of a mathematical formula used on a general purpose computer
in Benson preempts any use of the mathematical formula on any
computer."' Such a claim would prevent the use of the unpatentable
formula in many different contexts."' On the other hand, a similar
claim where the general purpose computer was replaced by a CD
played on a specific computer at a specific location during a specific
time of day would not raise the same types of preemption concerns as
the claim scope preempts much less of the abstract idea."' In looking
to the amount of preemption, it is important to distinguish the scope
of the abstract idea from the portion of the abstract idea that the
claim covers. For instance, the mathematical formula in Benson is of
much smaller scope than electromagnetism as referenced in Morse."'
What is important is not the scope of the unpatentable subject matter,
but the amount of the unpatentable subject matter that is preempted
by the claim. For instance, preemption of a small portion of a large
concept, like electromagnetism, could prove a greater impediment to
the public use than a large portion of a smaller abstract concept.
Once the amount of preemption is determined, the institution ought
to determine if the claim preempts so much of the abstract idea that it
108. Research Corp. Techs., Inc., 627 F.3d at 869. See generally infra Section IV-B.
109. Cybersource Corp, 654 F.3d at 1372-73. See generally infra Section IV-C.
110. See, e.g., Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72 ("IT]he patent would wholly preempt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.");
Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175 (holding that a principal cannot be patented because no one has an
exclusive right to a patent on a principal).
111. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
112. Id.
113. Though such a change in the claim would reduce preemption concerns, it does not
follow that by restricting scope a claim would become patent eligible. Instead, it merely
changes the balancing when determining patent eligibility.
114. Id.; O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 119.
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infringes on the "exclusive right" of the public to use the
unpatentable subject matter."5
The third factor that should impact patent eligibility is the
novelty and nonobviousness of the patent-eligible portions of the
claim. This analysis differs from those in sections 102 and 103
because it is focused only on the patent-eligible portions of the claim
as opposed to the whole claim. Where the patent-eligible portions of
a claim are not novel, it indicates that the inventive concept of a claim
may be derived from the unpatentable portion of the claim rather
than the patent-eligible portion. Prometheus applies this factor when
it notes the "determining" step as a method that is "well known in the
art.""16 This factor, as well as Prometheus itself, also harkens back to
Flook's acknowledgement that the "inventive application of the
principle may be patented."' Thus, this will require an examiner or a
court to make a judgment about the novelty and obviousness of the
patent-eligible portion of a claim. To do so, an examiner or the court
may have to draft its own claim language to compare the scope of the
patent-eligible portion of a claim to a prior art claim."
8
After separately analyzing the dependency, preemption and
novelty/nonobviousness of a claim, examiners or the court should
balance the three factors. There are a couple of situations in which
one factor will predominate and indicate that a claim is patent
eligible. First, if the unpatentable portion of the claim depends
entirely on the existence of the patent-eligible portion of the claim for
utility, the invention will almost certainly be patent eligible. This is
true because the invention would have no utility absent the patent-
eligible portion, which also means that the claim does not preempt
any practical use of the unpatentable portion of the claim. Second,
where the patent-eligible portions of a claim are both novel and
nonobvious, the claim is likely directed to patent-eligible subject
matter. This is true because such novelty appearing in the patent-
eligible portion of a claim indicates that the claim is directed to an
application of the unpatentable subject matter rather than claiming
the unpatentable subject matter itself.
115. Le Roy, 55 U.S. at 175.
116. Mayo Collab. Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
117. Parker, 437 U.S. at 594.
118. By suggesting that an examiner or court draft claim language to describe the
patent-eligible portion of a claim, I do not mean to suggest that such drafting will be easy
or without controversy. But, where claims inherently capture both patent-eligible and
unpatentable concepts, it is critical to understand and articulate the inventive concept.
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But, while these two situations will yield relatively simple
balancing, there are many situations in which there will be marginal
dependence on the patent-eligible portion of a claim for an invention
to have utility, some preemption of the unpatentable portion of the
claim, and little novelty in the patent-eligible portion. In such unclear
cases, the examining institution should remember patent system's
goal of properly incentivizing and rewarding innovation when it
balances the three factors.
The proposed three-factor analysis will not always be
straightforward. Process claims, like the one in Prometheus, are more
likely to lend themselves easily to this analysis because the individual
steps will often be directed to either patent-eligible or unpatentable
subject matter. Further, the reason claims are currently treated as a
whole for infringement purposes is the difficulty in comparing two
patents without using the claim terms themselves to provide the
metes and bounds for the analysis."9 Thus, it will be difficult for an
examiner or the court to articulate an inventive concept within the
claim language and compare that to inventive concepts in the prior
art. But, while sometimes difficult, this three-factor analysis will lead
to more predictability and rationality in administrative and judicial
decisions on the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.
IV. Federal Circuit Cases Post-Bilski and Application of the
Three-Factor Analysis
After the Supreme Court issued their decision in Bilski, the
Federal Circuit issued decisions in several cases. Analyzing each of
these decisions will provide an understanding of how the Federal
Circuit interpreted and applied the Supreme Court's precedents prior
to Prometheus. Also, by applying the proposed analysis to the claims
at issue, it will demonstrate how the proposed three-factor analysis
clarifies the patent-eligibility determination.
A. SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission
First, in SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission, the court evaluated the eligibility of a claim for
calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver.' 2° Independent
119. See supra Section I-B.
120. SiRF Tech., Inc., 601 F.3d at 1323.
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claims from two patents were at issue, along with their accompanying
dependent claims.' The independent claim in the '801 patent recited
A method for calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver
and an absolute time of reception of satellite signals comprising:
providing pseudoranges that estimate the raiige of the GPS receiver
to a plurality of GPS satellites; providing an estimate of an absolute
time of reception of a plurality of satellite signals; providing an
estimate of a position of the GPS receiver; providing satellite
ephemeris data; computing absolute position and absolute time using
said pseudoranges by updating said estimate of an absolute time and
the estimate of position of the GPS receiver.'
The independent claim in the '187 patent recited
A method, comprising: estimating a plurality of states
associated with a satellite signal receiver, the plurality of states
including a time tag error state, the time tag error state relating
a local time associated with said satellite signal receiver and an
absolute time associated with signals from a plurality of
satellites; and forming a dynamic model relating the plurality of
states, the dynamic model operative to compute position of the
satellite signal receiver.'
The court applied the machine-or-transformation test, holding
that "the use of a specific machine or transformation of an article
must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to impart patent
eligibility."'24 Though this claim used an algorithm, the court found
the claim to be directed to patent-eligible subject matter because the
GPS receiver is a machine and "without a GPS receiver it would be
impossible to either generate pseudoranges or to determine the
position of the GPS receiver."'5 The court also held that the presence
of the GPS receiver placed a "meaningful limit on the scope of the
claims.' 26  In so holding, the Court seemed to lay out a test to
determine when a meaningful limit is imposed, holding that "it must
play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be
performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for
121. Id. at 1331.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1331-32.
124. Id. at 1332.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1332-33.
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permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly."' 27 Further, the
court specifically noted that the method described by these patents
could not be performed without a machine.'2
This decision, while providing some discussion of the GPS system
as integral to the claimed process, is conclusory. The test articulated
by the Federal Circuit, that the machine play a "significant part" in
the process, does not really provide any guidance beyond the Court's
previous note that post-solution activity around unpatentable subject
matter does not lead to a patent-eligible invention while an
application of an unpatentable idea may be patent eligible.' 9 If the
court were to adopt the three-factor analysis, the outcome would be
the same, but the rationale would be much clearer.
To start, the court would articulate the unpatentable subject
matter incorporated in the claim as well as the patent-eligible
elements of the claim. For the '801 patent, the court may have
declared that the calculations and estimates were directed to
unpatentable subject matter as focused on calculations and estimates
that could be made entirely in the human mind. Similarly, they would
likely have held that the GPS receiver, satellite signals, and GPS
satellites were not abstract ideas and, on their own, are patent-eligible
subject matter. Then, the Court would need to perform the three-
factor analysis to determine if the patent-eligible subject matter
renders the claim patent eligible.
First, the court will look to the dependence of the unpatentable
subject matter on the patent-eligible subject matter. Here, the court
specifically notes that the human mind is unable to receive the
satellite signals. Thus, while the algorithm could be performed
mentally, it would not have any utility that would help a person
determine their position without the patent-eligible subject matter in
the claim.
Second, the court will look to the preemption of the
unpatentable portion of the claim. Because the algorithm cannot be
used without the patent-eligible subject matter, no use of the
unpatentable mental process would seem to be preempted by the
grant of this patent.
Third, the court will look to the novelty and nonobviousness of
the patent-eligible portions of the claim. Here, based on the court's
127. Id. at 1333.
128. Id.
129. Parker, 437 U.S. at 590.
[Vol. 5:1
Winter 2013]THE SUM OF THE PARTS IS GREATER THAN THE WHOLE 127
discussion, the patent-eligible portions of the claim seem to be at least
obvious and perhaps lacking novelty as well."' Thus, this factor
should weigh against patent eligibility.
To be consistent with precedent, the court should hold that
where no preemption of the abstract idea occurs and there is
complete dependence of the unpatentable subject matter on the
patent-eligible subject matter to achieve the claimed utility, the claim
is patent eligible even if the patent-eligible portions are not novel.
This would not relieve the patentee of the burden of showing that the
claim as a whole, including both unpatentable and patent-eligible
subject matter, is novel and nonobvious under sections 102 and 103,
but this combination could be treated as a combination of known
elements, which may be patentable. 3' Further, such a balancing is
consistent with the machine-or-transformation test's status as a useful
clue to patentability because most claims that pass the machine-or-
transformation test will also weigh in favor of patent eligibility in both
the dependence and preemption factors.
B. Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.
Next, in Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
the court evaluated a patent that used an algorithm to enable digital
halftoning.'32 The patent in controversy was for a method of
halftoning by comparing the image of each pixel to a specific blue
noise mask designed to be visually pleasing.'33 The Court based its
decision upon claims from two patents. 3' Claim 1 of the '310 patent
recited
A method for the halftoning of gray scale images by utilizing a
pixel-by-pixel comparison of the image against a blue noise
mask in which the blue noise mask is comprised of a random
non-deterministic, non-white noise single valued function which
130. SiRF Tech., Inc., 601 F.3d at 1331-32 (referring to the claimed GPS receivers and
satellites generally without any indication that the receivers and satellites differ from those
in the prior art).
131. MPEP, § 2106 ("[A] new combination of steps in a process may be patentable
even though all the constituents of the combination were well known and in common use
before the combination was made.").
132. Research Corp. Techs., Inc., 627 F.3d at 862. Halftoning allows computers to
present many different shades of color tones with a limited number of pixel colors. Id.
133. Id. at 864-65.
134. Id. at 869.
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is designed to produce visually pleasing dot profiles when
thresholded at any level of said gray scale images.
Claim 2 of the '310 patent recited "[t]he method of claim 1,
wherein said blue noise mask is used to halftone a color image. ' -"
Claim 11 of the '228 patent recited
A method for the halftoning of color images, comprising the
steps of utilizing, in turn, a pixel-by-pixel comparison of each of
a plurality of color planes of said color image against a blue
noise mask in which the blue noise mask is comprised of a
random non-deterministic, non-white noise single valued
function which is designed to provide visually pleasing dot
profiles when thresholded at any level of said color images,
wherein a plurality of blue noise masks are separately utilized
to perform said pixel-by-pixel comparison and in which at least
one of said blue noise masks is independent and uncorrelated
with the other blue noise masks.37
Because Bilski did not "provide a rigid formula or definition for
abstractness," the Federal Circuit, too, declined to define abstract.'m
Instead, the court merely held that abstractness "should exhibit itself
so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible
subject matter and the statutory context that directs primary attention
on the patentability criteria of the rest of the Patent Act."139 Again,
this is nothing more than restating the problem of identifying whether
an application is unpatentable post-solution activity or a patent-
eligible application. In this case, the court finds that there is nothing
abstract about the method of halftoning because it is a specific
application of a technology, not merely a post-solution activity."
If the court applied the three-factor analysis and divided the
claim into unpatentable and patent-eligible portions, it would likely
have found that the actual comparison of each pixel image to a noise
mask was an unpatentable mental process. But, like SiRF Tech., the
court also would likely have held that the inputs to that comparison in
the pixels themselves are not abstract. Whether the blue mask itself
135. Id. at 865.
136. Id.
137. Id.
13& Id. at 868.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 869.
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is patent eligible seems to be an open question. On the one hand, it is
an abstract assignment of threshold numbers to pixels. But, on the
other hand, if there is no physicality requirement in the abstract idea
doctrine, this computation may be held to be patent eligible though
not tangible because it would seem to have no use outside of half-
toning pixels."" Thus, forcing the court in this case to designate the
various components of the claim as directed to either patent-eligible
or unpatentable subject matter may have helped clarify the
materiality requirement. Assuming only the pixels themselves are
patent eligible, the pixels would be analyzed according to the three
factors.
First, the court will first look to the dependence of the
unpatentable subject matter on the patent-eligible subject matter.
Here, there could be no comparison between a pixel and the noise
mask without the pixels themselves. While the mathematical
comparison of pixel values and noise masks could be performed
mentally without the pixels, there would be no utility to such a
comparison without the patent-eligible subject matter. Therefore,
this factor weighs in favor of patent eligibility.
Second, the court will look to the preemption of the
unpatentable portion of the claim. Because the algorithm cannot be
used without the patent-eligible subject matter, the grant of this
patent would not seem to preempt any alternate use of the
unpatentable mental process. Therefore, this factor also weighs in
favor of patent eligibility.
Third, the court will look to the novelty and nonobviousness of
the patent-eligible portions of the claim. Here, based on the court's
discussion, the patent-eligible portions of the claim (i.e., the pixels)
seem to be at least obvious and probably lacking novelty as well
because pixels were known prior to the patent. Thus, because the
pixel itself is not the inventive concept of the claim, this factor weighs
against patent eligibility.
The balancing is similar to that discussed above for SiRF
Technology. Again, the court should hold that where no preemption
of the abstract idea occurs and there is complete dependence of the
unpatentable subject matter on the patent-eligible subject matter to
achieve the claimed utility, the claim is patent eligible even if the
patent-eligible portions are not novel.
141. See Ben McEniery, Phyicality and the Information Age: A Normative Perspective
on the Patent Eligibility of Non-Physical Methods, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 106,123
(2010).
130 HASTINGS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
C. Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.
In Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., Cybersource
patented a method of detecting credit card fraud.42 Claim 3 of the
'154 patent recited
A method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction
over the Internet comprising the steps of: a) obtaining
information about other transactions that have utilized an
Internet address that is identified with the [ ] credit card
transaction; b) constructing a map of credit card numbers based
upon the other transactions and; c) utilizing the map of credit
card numbers to determine if the credit card transaction is
valid.
43
Claim 2 of the '154 patent recited
A computer readable medium containing program instructions
for detecting fraud in a credit card transaction between a
consumer and a merchant over the Internet, wherein execution
of the program instructions by one or more processors of a
computer system causes the one or more processors to carry out
the steps of: a) obtaining credit card information relating to the
transactions from the consumer; and b) verifying the credit card
information based upon values of plurality of parameters, in
combination with information that identifies the consumer, and
that may provide an indication whether the credit card
transaction is fraudulent, wherein each value among the
plurality of parameters is weighted in the verifying step
according to an importance, as determined by the merchant, of
that value to the credit card transaction, so as to provide the
merchant with a quantifiable indication of whether the credit
card transaction is fraudulent, wherein execution of the
program instructions by one or more processors of a computer
system causes that one or more processors to carry out the
further steps of; [a] obtaining information about other
transactions that have utilized an Internet address that is
identified with the credit card transaction; [b] constructing a
map of credit card numbers based upon the other transactions;
and [c] utilizing the map of credit card numbers to determine if
the credit card transaction is valid."'1
142. Cybersource Corp, 654 F.3d at 1367.
143. Id. at 1370.
144. Id. at 1373-74.
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The court's analysis noted that the machine-or-transformation
test is still a useful clue to patentability and also noted that Claim 3 of
the '154 patent did not "meet either prong of the machine-or-
transformation test.' '4 ' The court then analogized this case to Benson
and Flook, holding that Claim 3 was also directed to an unpatentable
mental process.'4 It also noted that a mental process must be tied to
another category of statutory subject matter to be patent eligible. 47
The court then notes that a human can go on the Internet to find the
input data, perform the required method in his mind, perhaps with
the aid of pen and paper, and then come up with a result."
If the court performed the three-factor analysis on Claim 3, it
would first divide the claim into unpatentable and patent-eligible
portions. In this case, the court would have found that most of the
claim was directed to unpatentable mental processes, as it did. But by
specifically forcing the court to recognize whether or not the Internet
is patent-eligible subject matter, patent practitioners would gain a
more clear understanding of section 1O1.'4 9 Regardless, the computer-
readable medium itself is patent eligible. After dividing the claim, the
court would then apply the three-factor analysis.
First, the court would look to the dependence of the
unpatentable subject matter on the patent-eligible subject matter.
Here, the court noted that the credit fraud detection process could be
performed solely with pen and paper. Thus, the unpatentable mental
process embodied in the claim could be performed without relying on
the patent-eligible portion of the claim. Therefore, this factor weighs
against patent eligibility.
Second, the court would look to the preemption of the
unpatentable portion of the claim. Because the algorithm could be
used without the patent-eligible subject matter, all uses of the
unpatentable method on any computer readable medium would be
preempted. Thus, this claim preempts a large portion of the abstract
idea's utility and weighs against patent eligibility.
Third, the court would evaluate the novelty and nonobviousness
of the patent-eligible portions of the claim. Here, nothing
145. Id. at 1369-70.
146. Id. at 1371-72.
147. Id. at 1372 (citing In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967,980 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
148. Id. at 1372-73.
149. See id. at 1370. The court seemed to skirt this issue, holding only that
"[r]egardless of whether 'the internet' can be viewed as a machine, it is clear that the
internet cannot perform the fraud detection steps of the claimed method. Id.
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distinguishes the computer readable medium itself from any other
computer readable medium. Thus, it is certainly obvious and likely to
lack novelty. Therefore, this factor also weighs against patent
eligibility.
In this case, the balancing of the three factors is easy as all three
factors weigh against patentability. Thus, the claim should be
rejected as not directed to patent-eligible subject matter.
D. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC
The Federal Circuit also considered Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu,
LLC. 5' There, the court considered the validity of the '545 patent.
Claim 1 of the '545 patent recites
A method for distribution of products over the Internet via a
facilitator, said method comprising the steps of: a first step of
receiving, from a content provider, media products that are
covered by intellectual property rights protection and are
available for purchase, wherein each said media product being
comprised of at least one of text data, music data, and video
data; a second step of selecting a sponsor message to be
associated with the media product, said sponsor message being
selected from a plurality of sponsor messages, said second step
including accessing an activity log to verify that the total
number of times which the sponsor message has been
previously presented is less than the number of transaction
cycles contracted by the sponsor of the sponsor message; a third
step of providing the media product for sale at an Internet
website; a fourth step of restricting general public access to said
media product; a fifth step of offering to a consumer access to
the media product without charge to the consumer on the
precondition that the consumer views the sponsor message; a
sixth step of receiving from the consumer a request to view the
sponsor message, wherein the consumer submits said request in
response to being offered access to the media product; a
seventh step of, in response to receiving the request from the
consumer, facilitating the display of a sponsor message to the
consumer; an eighth step of, if the sponsor message is not an
interactive message, allowing said consumer access to said
media product after said step of facilitating the display of said
sponsor message; a ninth step of, if the sponsor message is an
interactive message, presenting at least one query to the
consumer and allowing said consumer access to said media
product after receiving a response to said at least one query; a
tenth step of recording the transaction event to the activity log,
150. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
[Vol. 5:1
Winter 2013]THE SUM OF THE PARTS IS GREATER THAN THE WHOLE 133
said tenth step including updating the total number of times the
sponsor message has been presented; and an eleventh step of
receiving gayment from the sponsor of the sponsor message
displayed.
The court noted that the '545 patent was an attempt to solve
problems related to the declining number of Internet users viewing
banner advertisements. As such, the court found it was more closely
akin to a specific application used in the marketplace rather than an
abstract idea." The court also noted that the claim involved
"computers and applications of computer technologies. '' 1 3 Then, the
court engaged in an analysis with some similarity to the three-factor
analysis. The court first noted that advertising as currency is an
abstract idea.54  But, because the steps involved computer
programming and were limited to a specific application of this idea in
the Internet context, 5 the court held that, as a whole, the claim was
directed to patent-eligible subject matter.5 It further explained its
decision by noting that the programming of a general purpose
computer turns that computer into a specific purpose computer and
that enablement of the computer is a separate matter for discussion
outside of section 101 patent eligibility.
57
To begin the proposed three factor analysis, the claim must be
divided into unpatentable and patent-eligible portions. Here, the
division is similar to the one the court actually undertook. The court
analyzed the component elements of the claim and cogently pointed
out the differences between the unpatentable abstract idea and the
patent-eligible subject matter in the claim. In this case, the patent-
eligible portion of the claim is the specific purpose computer in the
Internet context. Once the claim is divided, the three-factor analysis
should be performed.
First, the court would first look to the dependence of the
unpatentable subject matter on the patent-eligible subject matter.
Here, the use of advertising as currency could theoretically be
achieved outside of a specific use computer. But, it is tough to
151. Id. at 1324-25.
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imagine a situation where the real time pairing could be done outside
of the Internet context that the court seemed to treat as patent
eligible. Thus, this factor could weigh either towards or against
patent eligibility depending on how the court viewed the scope of the
utility of the abstract idea.
Second, the court would look to the preemption of the
unpatentable portion of the claim. Here, if advertising as currency
has uses outside of the Internet context, the use of a specific purpose
computer and the Internet is a large preemption of the abstract idea.
But, if the abstract idea has no specific utility absent the Internet,
then there can be no true preemption because the use would be
additional to the use of the idea and not preemptive of it. Therefore,
this factor could again weigh either in favor of or against patent
eligibility depending on how the court defined the patent-eligible
portion of the claims.
Third, the court would look to the novelty and nonobviousness
of the patent-eligible portions of the claim. Here, it is difficult to
determine what the court is referring to as the patent-eligible portion.
If it means that a specific purpose computer is patent-eligible, even if
the specificity is based upon the abstract idea, it may be both novel
and non-obvious. But, the court could also find that any
programming of an abstract idea is inherently obvious. Thus, it is
difficult to determine which way this factor would turn.
In this case, balancing each factor alone, and the factors in
combination, is nearly impossible without greater clarity on which
portions of the claim are patent eligible, which are directed to
unpatentable subject matter, and what the court considers the utility
of both the abstract idea and the claim to be. Based on the court's
decision, it seems as though it considered the utility of the idea in the
internet context to be the purpose of the claim and that the mental
process had no utility without the patent-eligible subject matter. But,
regardless of how the court would define the unpatentable and
patent-eligible portions of this claim, explicitly requiring such a
division would provide patent practitioners with a better
understanding of patent eligibility.
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E. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber
In Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, Huber challenged Dealertrack's
patenting of a process to automate the funding of car loans through a
"central processor."' 58 Claim 1 of the '427 patent recites
A computer aided method of managing a credit application, the
method comprising the steps of: [A] receiving credit application
data from a remote application entry and display device; [B]
selectively forwarding the credit application data to remote
funding source terminal devices; [C] forwarding funding
decision data from at least one of the remote funding source
terminal devices to the remote application entry and display
device; [D] wherein the selectively forwarding the credit
application data step further comprises: [D1] sending at least a
portion of a credit application to more than one of said remote
funding sources substantially at the same time; [D2] sending at
least a portion of a credit application to more than one of said
remote funding source sequentially until a finding [sic, funding]
source returns a positive funding decision; [D3] sending at least
a portion of a credit application to a first one of said remote
funding sources, and then, after a predetermined time, sending
to at least one other remote funding source, until one of the
finding [sic, funding] sources returns a positive funding decision
or until all funding sources have been exhausted; or, [D4]
sending the credit application from a first remote funding
source to a second remote finding [sic, funding] source if the
first funding source declines to approve the credit application!"
The court's analysis distilled the claimed method into "three
steps: receiving data from one source (step A), selectively forwarding
the data (step B), performed according to step D), and forwarding
reply data to the first source (step C)."'' The court then dismissed
the computer readable medium limitation in the preamble, holding
that this limitation is "no less abstract than the idea of a clearinghouse
itself.' 16' Finally, the court noted that a field of use limitation does
not make otherwise unpatentable subject matter patentable.'62 Again,
this decision would have been more clear had the court specifically
158. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
159. Id. at 1317.
160. Id. at 1317.
161. Jd. at 1317.
162. Id.
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labeled certain portions of the claim as directed to patent-eligible or
unpatentable subject matter and followed the three-factor analysis.
In dividing the claim before performing the three-factor analysis,
the court would likely consider everything outside of the claim's
preamble to be directed to unpatentable subject matter while the
computer readable medium is patent eligible. The court would then
analyze the patent-eligible portion of the claim based upon the three-
factors.
First, the court would first look to the dependence of the
unpatentable subject matter on the patent-eligible subject matter.
Here, there is no reason why the claim could not be performed
without a computer readable medium. Thus, the utility of the
unpatentable subject matter does not depend on the patent-eligible
subject matter. Therefore, this factor weighs against patent eligibility.
Second, the court would look to the preemption of the
unpatentable portion of the claim. Because a computer readable
medium covers many of the possible ways of using the unpatentable
portion of the claim, the proposed claim preempts a large portion of
the abstract idea. This factor also weighs against patent eligibility.
Third, the court will look to the novelty and nonobviousness of
the patent-eligible portions of the claim. A computer readable
medium itself lacks novelty. Thus, this factor also weighs against
patent eligibility.
In this case, the balancing is easy because all three factors weigh
against patent eligibility. Thus, the court's decision would not be
impacted by the proposed method.
F. Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease LLC
Finally, the Federal Circuit considered Fort Properties, Inc. v.
American Master Lease LLC. 63 Claim 1 of the '788 patent at issue
recited,
A method of creating a real estate investment instrument
adapted for performing tax-deferred exchanges comprising:
aggregating real property to form a real estate portfolio;
encumbering the property in the real estate port- folio with a
master agreement; and creating a plurality of deedshares by
dividing title in the real estate portfolio into a plurality of ten-
ant-in-common deeds of at least one predeter- mined
denomination, each of the plurality of deedshares subject to a
163. Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC,671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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provision in the master agreement for reaggregating the
plurality of tenant-in-common deeds after a specified interval.'"
The court considered the other independent and dependent
claims 1 - 31 at issue as similar to Claim 1 for § 101 analysis
purposes.'6 Claims 32 - 41 also contained the additional limitation
that a computer "generate a plurality of deedshares.'6
In its analysis, the Court equated claims 1 - 31 at issue to the
claims in Bilski, noting that the Bilski claims were not associated with
a computer. 67 Then, the court held that the claim was not removed
from being an abstract idea merely because it contained references to
material things like deeds, contracts, and real property.168 For claims
32 - 41, the court used Ultramercial and Dealertrack to represent the
difference between claims involving a computer directed to a
patentable process and insignificant post-solution activity.'O Based on
these precedents, the court held that the claim was directed to
unpatentable subject matter because the computer did not "play a
significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed."'70
Again, the court appeared to base its decision on the claimed
computer reciting a broad and general limitation instead of a narrow
one.1
71
In this case, if the court divided the claim into patent-eligible
subject matter and unpatentable subject matter, the court would have
been forced to articulate whether the real property, master
agreements, and deedshares themselves were patent-eligible subject
matter. Real property, as claimed, likely included only the land,
which is not itself patent-eligible subject matter, even if it is tangible.
Further, even though the master agreements and deedshares are
written instruments that reflect agreements, the court has held that
writing down an abstract idea does not make it patentable.' Thus, all
of Claims 1 - 31 would have likely been held to be directed to abstract
ideas and would not be patent eligible. With respect to Claims 32 -
164. Id. at 1319.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1322.
168. Id. at 1323.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Dealertrack, Inc., 674 F.3d at 1317.)
171. Id. at 1323-24.
172. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
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41, this case is similar to Dealertrack, as a computer, like a computer
readable medium is likely patent-eligible subject matter. After this
division, the court would again perform the three-factor analysis.
First, the court would first look to the dependence of the
unpatentable subject matter on the patent-eligible subject matter.
Here, there is no reason why the claim could not be performed
without a computer. In fact, that is exactly what claims 1-31
demonstrate because nothing in those claims is patent eligible. Thus,
the utility of the unpatentable subject matter does not depend on the
patent-eligible subject matter.
Second, the court would look to the preemption of the
unpatentable portion of the claim. A computer seems to be a broad
grant, which would cover many ways of using the unpatentable
portion of the claim. Thus, the proposed claim preempts a large
portion of the abstract idea.
Third, the court would look to the novelty and non-obviousness
of the patent-eligible portions of the claim. As discussed above, the
computer readable medium itself lacks novelty. Like the previous
factors, this factor also weighs against patent eligibility.
Again, the balancing in this case is easy because all three factors
weigh against patent eligibility.
V. Conclusion
No consensus has been reached regarding the definition of an
abstract idea, the bounds of patent eligibility remain unclear, and
rationale to explain the court's decisions is still a hot topic in patent
law.' But while some uncertainty may always exist in the bounds of
patent-eligible subject matter as new technologies arise, a new
approach to section 101 analyses can provide for greater clarity in
determining what makes an invention patent eligible. If the courts
were to move away from always treating the claim as a whole, and
instead analyzed the claim in component parts, they would clarify the
requirements of section 101 and help aid patent applicants,
examiners, attorneys, and even the courts themselves in articulating
standards for patent eligibility.
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